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AGAINST LAWYER RETAINING LIENS
John Leubsdorf*
INTRODUCTION
Suppose your former lawyer claims a fee that you think is more
than you owe. The lawyer can withhold any of your papers or other
property that happen to be in his or her possession, even if you need
them urgently for a pending lawsuit or transaction. Ordinarily, your
only options are to pay what the lawyer claims, to abandon your
papers or property, or to pay another lawyer to challenge the fee
claim in court. Because a court challenge is cumbersome and costly, if
your papers or property have any value, you will probably wind up
paying your former lawyer more than you think you owe, no matter
how reasonable your own view is.
The right of a lawyer to assert in this way what is called a retaining
lien over a client's papers and property is deeply offensive to
professional values and the public interest. Its effect-indeed, its
purpose-is to inconvenience clients to pressure them into paying
whatever their lawyers claim. It gives lawyers, who already have
advantages in fee disputes, additional advantages over their clients. It
penalizes clients who do just what the legal profession encourages by
entrusting their documents and property to their lawyers. And yet the
help it gives lawyers in collecting justly due fees is random at best. Far
less objectionable and more useful ways of protecting lawyers' proper
interest in payment are available.
Despite the retaining lien's flaws, authority in all but a few states
upholds it,1 and lawyers continue to use it.' Rules of professional
responsibility allow valid liens to prevail against a lawyer's obligation
* Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School-Newark. The Dean's Research Fund of
Rutgers School of Law-Newark provided funding for this Article. Jonathan Rose,
Keith Sharfman and Mark Weiner provided helpful comments. The author was
Associate Reporter for the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers and was the
primary drafter of its treatment of attorney liens, but does not write here in that
capacity.
1. See discussion infra Part I.
2. A LEXIS search reveals 288 reported federal and state opinions in the 1991-
2000 decade in which the phrase "retaining lien" appears, almost all of them involving
such a lien. There are probably many more instances in which assertion of a lien does
not give rise to a reported opinion, for example because the client pays the sum in
dispute.
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to return papers and property to a client when a representation ends.3
Scholars of professional responsibility have almost totally neglected
the retaining lien4 as they have neglected some other aspects of the
financial relationship between clients and lawyers. The Restatement
of the Law Governing Lawyers rejects lawyer retaining liens not
authorized by statute, but it remains to be seen what influence this
rejection will have.5
This Article urges the abolition of the retaining lien. After
describing the operation of the lien, I set forth its various drawbacks.
I then consider some other ways in which lawyers may collect fees,
ways less offensive and at least as effective as retaining liens. Finally,
I discuss some other problems concerning access to client files that
abolition of the retaining lien would bring into greater prominence.
I. THE RETAINING LIEN AND ITS OPERATION
The law of the retaining lien displays a certain amount of
ambivalence. On the one hand, the lien is well established. On the
other, various anomalies and exceptions suggest some underlying
disquiet, for which it will later appear there are good reasons.
Retaining liens are by no means a universal perquisite of the
world's legal professions. In France, for example, "an advocate may
not retain documents to obtain the payment of his fees" and this
prohibition may well extend to client funds.6 India's Supreme Court
recently forbad retaining liens on litigation files.7 Some other nations
allow retention of funds or of documents when reasonable in the
circumstances.8 Even in England, the source of our own lawyer lien
law, the law has been a bit more ambivalent than might be thought.
Barristers have never been entitled to liens, and indeed have been
prohibited from suing clients for fees-not a great hardship, because
3. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.8(j)(1), 1.16(d) (2000) (providing a lawyer
may "acquire a lien granted by law to secure the lawyer's fee or expenses" and "may
retain papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by other law"); Model
Code of Prof'l Responsibility, DR 5-103(A)(1), 9-102(B)(4) (1969) (similar).
4. But see Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Lawyers' Contracts is Different, 67
Fordham L. Rev. 443, 467-72 (1998) (describing retaining and charging liens, although
not written by a teacher of professional responsibility); Note, Attorney's Retaining
Lien Over Former Client's Papers, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 296 (1965); Comment, Oregon
Attorneys' Liens: Their Function and Ethics, 27 Willamette L. Rev. 891 (1991).
5. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 43(1) & cmt. b (2000).
See also Roscoe Pound, American Trial Law. Found., Comm'n on Prof'l
Responsibility, The American Lawyer's Code of Conduct R. 5.5 (Public Discussion
Draft 1980) (forbidding retaining lien, but allowing lawyers to retain unpaid-for work
product).
6. Jacques Hamelin & Andr6 Damien, Les R~gles de la Profession d'Avocat 373
(8th ed. 1995).
7. RD Saxena v. Balram Prasad Sharma, (2000) 7 S.C.C. 264 (India).
8. William B. Fisch, Professional Services, in 8 Int'l Encyc. Comp. L. 9-161
(Werner Lorenz ed., 1999).
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solicitors are professionally obligated to ensure payment of barristers
they instruct.9 Solicitors, by contrast, may assert a retaining lien, ° but
their right tb do so was still unclear at the outset of the eighteenth
century" and was established definitively only during that century. 2
The United States (or at least its legal profession) enthusiastically
adopted the retaining lien, in some states by statute 3 and in others
under the common law, 4 just as it adopted the solicitor's right to sue
clients for fees. 5  There are, however, some exceptions. Five
jurisdictions reject the lien, five limit it, and five appear to have no
relevant authority. 6 In a handful of cases, federal legislation has been
held to preempt state retaining lien law. 7
9. Rondel v. Worsley, [1969] 1 A.C. 191 (H.L. 1969), overruled in other respects,
Arthur JS Hall & Co. v. Simons, [2000] 3 W.L.R. 543 (H.L. 2000); Ronald F.
Roxburgh, Rondel v. Worsley: The Historical Background, 84 L.Q. Rev. 178 (1968);
The Guide to the Professional Conduct of Solicitors 367-68 (8th ed. 1999) (discussing
solicitors' liability for barristers' fees). See also Code of Conduct of the Bar of
England and Wales 307(f) (7th ed. 2000) (stating that a barrister may not receive or
handle client money or other assets).
10. See, e.g., Bentley v. Gaisford, [1997] 1 All E.R. 842 (C.A. 1996); The Guide to
the Professional Conduct of Solicitors 251-52 (8th ed. 1999); 1 Cordery on Solicitors
IT 933-1100 (9th ed. 1996).
11. See Anonymous, 91 Eng. Rep. 1393 (K.B. 1694) (Holt, C.J., at nisi prius)
(stating that attorney may not detain executed deed); Ex parte Bush, 22 Eng. Rep. 93
(Ch. 1734) (recognizing lien); Wilkins v. Carmichael, 99 Eng. Rep. 70, 72 (K.B. 1779)
(Mansfield, C.J.) (noting that lien is "not very ancient"); Commerell v. Poynton, 36
Eng. Rep. 273 (Ch. 1818) (Eldon, Ch.) (holding that lien may not be used to keep
from client documents needed in pending litigation). The holding of Commerell was
later read as limited to cases in which the lien was asserted by a solicitor who
withdrew from a representation. See, e.g., In re Faithful, 6 L.R.-Eq. 325 (V.C. 1868).
12. See, e.g., Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Law of Agency § 383 (1st ed.
1839) (listing English precedents and noting that practice in the United States was
variable); Whitley Stokes, A Treatise on the Liens of Attornies, Solicitors, and Other
Legal Practitioners 3-4 & n.(c) (1860).
13. E.g., Alaska Stat. § 34.35.430 (Michie 2002); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 7-108 (1997);
Or. Rev. Stat. § 87.430 (1987).
14. E.g., Marsh, Day & Calhoun v. Solomon, 529 A.2d 702 (Conn. 1987); State ex
rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Cummings, 863 P.2d 1164 (Okla. 1993); see generally
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 464(b) (1958); Restatement of Security § 62(b)
(1941); 2 Robert L. Rossi, Attorneys' Fees 232-46 (2d ed. 1995). For earlier authority,
see In re Paschal, 77 U.S. 483 (1870); Hutchinson & Buchannan v. Howard, 15 Vt. 544
(1843).
15. See John Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee
Recovery, Law & Contemp. Probs., Winter 1984, at 9, 16.
16. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 43, cmt. b,
Reporter's Note (citing authority) (2000), to which should be added Mont. R. Prof'l
Conduct 1.8(a)(2), 1.8(j)(3), 1.16(d) (2002); N.D. R. Prof'l Conduct 1.19 (2003). See
also Haw. S. Ct. Disciplinary Bd. Op. 28 (as updated 2001) (holding that in absence of
authority recognizing lien, lawyers should not assert it), at
http://hsba.hostme.com/Disc/disc.htm.
17. E.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. Elman, 949 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding
that federal legislation allows federal agency to obtain papers of insolvent financial
institution despite lawyer's lien); Wynn v. AC Rochester, GM Corp., 982 F. Supp. 926
(W.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting that in some cases, federal attorney fee statute preempts
lien, although this case itself was not determined to be governed by a federal statute).
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The essence of the retaining lien is that a lawyer claiming to be
entitled to a fee may impound a client's papers, money, or other
property that are in the lawyer's possession until the fee has been
paid."8 The lien only applies to the client's property, as opposed to
that of third parties, and the lawyer loses it by voluntarily
surrendering possession of the property without a safeguarding court
order or similar provision.19 But the lawyer may impound all client
property in his or her possession, not just property related to the fee
claim.2 The retaining lien should be distinguished from the charging
lien, to be discussed later, which in many states protects a lawyer's
right to be paid out of money he or she has recovered for a client.21
A client may recover the impounded property by paying what the
lawyer claims or by securing an adjudication that a smaller sum is due
and paying that sum. When the fee dispute concerns a pending
litigation, in some jurisdictions the court before which the case is
pending may resolve the dispute summarily.2 Alternatively, the client
may bring a separate action to recover the impounded papers or
property, in the course of which the fee claim will be resolved. In at
least ten jurisdictions, a client may compel a lawyer to arbitrate a fee
dispute. 3
If the fee dispute concerns a pending litigation, the client may ask
the court to order the lawyer to release the impounded property upon
the client's posting bond in an amount set by the court.24 This is often
done when one lawyer replaces another during a case.25 The client
must still have the merits of the fee claim adjudicated in order to
18. The lien also may give the lawyer who properly asserts it priority over other
creditors of the client. Compare, e.g., In re Hodes, 239 B.R. 239 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1999)
(upholding priority) with, e.g., In re Coronet Ins. Co., 698 N.E.2d 598 (Ill. App. Ct.
1998) (rejecting priority). See also infra note 101.
19. See, e.g., Indus. Network Sys., Inc. v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 54 F.3d
150 (3d Cir. 1995); Flake v. Frandsen, 578 P.2d 516 (Utah 1978).
20. See, e.g., Mones v. Smith, 486 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 1986); Greek Catholic Union of
Russian Bhds. of the United States v. Russin, 17 A.2d 402 (Pa. 1941).
21. See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 221, § 50 (1999); N.Y. Jud. Law § 475, 475-a
(1983); Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 43(2) & cmts. d-g
(2000); see infra Part III.A.
22. See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code § 60.40.030 (1990); Jenkins v. Weinshienk, 670 F.2d
915 (10th Cir. 1982) (relying on federal ancillary jurisdiction, but concluding that
when lawyer impounds papers in action before court to enforce payment of fee
claimed in another matter the court may not adjudicate that fee claim); Restatement
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 42(1) (2000).
23. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6200(c) (West 2003); D.C. Bar R. XIII (2003); Ga.
State Bar R. 6-101 to 6-106 (2003); Mont. Rules on Arbitration of Fee Disputes R. 5.3,
5.5 (2002); 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 137.11 (2003); Mark Richard Cummisford, Resolving Fee
Disputes and Legal Malpractice Claims Using ADR, 85 Marq. L. Rev. 975, 995-99
(2002); see Model Rules for Fee Arbitration (1995).
24. E.g., S.D. Codified Laws § 16-18-24 (Michie 1995); N.D. Cent. Code § 27-13-06
(1991) (noting that release may be granted even if no case is pending).
25. E.g., Joseph Brenner Assocs., Inc. v. Starmaker Entm't, Inc., 82 F.3d 55 (2d
Cir. 1996).
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recover any overcharge, but in the meantime need not forgo the use of
property whose worth to the client may be even more than the
claimed fee.26 A few courts have released documents to clients who
cannot pay but who have an extraordinary need to use them, although
even then the lien continues to exist." Financial need in itself,
however, is apparently not enough to obtain such a modification. 8
Under a vague exception, a client willing and able to go to court
sometimes can have a retaining lien nullified because the lawyer held
the property assertedly covered by the lien for a special purpose. This
exception includes property that the lawyer holds under a trust or
escrow arrangement inconsistent with use of the property to pay the
lawyer's fee.29 But courts have also applied it-sometimes to the extent
of disciplining the lawyer for claiming a lien-when a lawyer receives
documents to be introduced into evidence, or receives funds to be
used to pay a settlement or a court reporter's anticipated fee or to
post bond in a pending proceeding." Granted such rulings, one might
think that all documents and property entrusted to a lawyer should be
considered given for a special purpose inconsistent with diversion to
the lawyer-to wit, use for the client's interests-unless the client
specifically expresses a purpose of paying the lawyer's fee. Yet
whatever the theoretical merit of this argument, in practice the
"special purpose" exception often does not prevent the lawyer from
asserting a retaining lien. Whether papers or property were given for
26. But see Or. Rev. Stat. § 87.435(2)(a) (1987) (requiring bond for 150% of
claimed fee).
27. Britton & Gray, P.C. v. Shelton, 69 P.3d 1210 (Okla. Civ. App. 2003)
(requiring judicial balancing); Miller v. Paul, 615 P.2d 615 (Alaska 1980); Hauptmann
v. Fawcett, 276 N.Y.S. 523 (App. Div. 1935), modified by 277 N.Y.S. 631 (App. Div.
1935) (regarding murder prosecution); Frenkel v. Frenkel, 599 A.2d 595 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1991) (regarding matrimonial action). For supporting dictum, see, for
example, Pomerantz v. Schandler, 704 F.2d 681, 683 (2d Cir. 1983).
28. In re San Juan Gold, Inc., 96 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1938); Andrew Hall & Assocs. v.
Ghanem, 679 So. 2d 60 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); In re Liquidation of Mile Square
Health Plan, 578 N.E.2d 1075 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); see Rotker v. Rotker, 761 N.Y.S.2d
787 (Sup. Ct. 2003) (holding that normal exigencies of litigation do not warrant
release of lien on case file). But see Lucky-Goldstar Int'l (America), Inc. v. Int'l Mfg.
Sales Co., 636 F. Supp. 1059 (N.D. I11. 1986) (stating that lawyer should forego lien).
In South Carolina, one of the states that has limited the retaining lien, a lawyer may
not assert a retaining lien against a client unable to pay. In re Anonymous Member of
S.C. Bar, 335 S.E.2d 803, 805 (S.C. 1985).
29. E.g., United States v. J.H.W. & Gitlitz Deli & Bar, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 1010
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); Home Sav. of Am., SSB v. Malart, Inc., 632 A.2d 827 (N.J. App. Div.
1993). Perhaps the rulings of some courts that child support payments are not subject
to attorney retaining liens can be explained on the similar theory that such payments
reach the lawyer subject to the law's special purpose of helping children. See Gary L.
Garrison, Annotation, Alimony or Child-Support Awards as Subject to Attorneys'
Liens, 49 A.L.R. 5th 595 (1997).
30. E.g., Nat'l Sales & Serv. Co. v. Superior Court, 667 P.2d 738 (Ariz. 1983); Fla.
Bar v. Bratton, 413 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 1982); Comm'n on Prof'l Ethics and Conduct v.
Nadler, 445 N.W.2d 358 (Iowa 1989); State ex rel. Okla. Bar Assoc. v. Cummings, 863
P.2d 1164 (Okla. 1993).
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a special purpose within the meaning of the law is often subject to
dispute,31 and until the dispute is resolved the lawyer continues to
impound them and the client continues to be pressured to pay what
the lawyer claims.
Another exception likewise waters down the impact of retaining
liens, but less than might be thought. Some courts deny a lien to a
lawyer who has withdrawn from a case or has been discharged for
cause by a client.32 Such rulings can best be explained as following
from the principle recognized by some courts that withdrawal or
discharge for cause forfeits a lawyer's right to a fee.33 When there is
no fee, there is no lien 4.3  But again, when a lawyer has some basis to
claim a fee, in practice there is a lien until a court rejects the claim. In
most jurisdictions, there is much room to dispute the scope of fee
forfeiture, the relationship between fee forfeiture and lien forfeiture,
and the existence of cause to discharge counsel.35 Unless large sums
are in question, the client is likely to settle the fee claim under
pressure from the lien before a court resolves the dispute.
II. WHY THE RETAINING LIEN IS UNFAIR
The attorney's retaining lien offends basic principles of professional
responsibility. It invites lawyers to make money by hurting their
former clients, gives lawyers an unreasonable advantage over clients
in fee disputes, and penalizes clients who trust their lawyers. And
with all these obnoxious features, it does little to fulfill its purpose of
helping lawyers collect fees that are justly due.
A. Biting the Hand that Does Not Feed You Enough
A lawyer's assertion of a retaining lien over a client's property in
the lawyer's possession can expose the client to substantial harm.
When the fee dispute arises from pending litigation, as in many of the
reported cases, the client will not be able to use his or her documents
in the litigation, or even to obtain access to them through discovery,36
31. E.g., Nat'l Sales & Serv. Co., 667 P.2d at 738.
32. E.g., Jenkins v. Weinshienk, 670 F.2d 915 (10th Cir. 1982); People ex rel.
MacFarlane v. Harthun, 581 P.2d 716 (Colo. 1978); Marsh, Day & Calhoun v.
Solomon, 529 A.2d 702 (Conn. 1987); In re Kaufman, 567 P.2d 957 (Nev. 1977).
33. E.g., Estate of Falco v. Decker, 233 Cal. Rptr. 807 (Ct. App. 1987); Teichner
by Teichner v. W. & J. Holsteins, Inc., 478 N.E.2d 177 (N.Y. 1985). But see
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers § 40 & Reporter's Note (2000) (adopting
a different rule for impact of termination on fee and discussing authority); id. § 43,
cmt. h & Reporter's Note (distinguishing fee forfeiture and lien forfeiture).
34. E.g., Indus. Network Sys., Inc. v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 54 F.3d 150
(3d Cir. 1995).
35. See, for example, Ismail v. Butler, 2 All E.R. 506 (Q.B. 1996), where the client
claimed the solicitors had forfeited their lien by withdrawing, but the solicitors
nevertheless asserted a lien, claiming to have been discharged.
36. Bulk Oil Transps. v. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co., 277 F. 25 (2d Cir. 1921);
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until the fee dispute is resolved. When the lien covers the client's
money, the client will be deprived of its use, and may be stymied in a
pending transaction. As one of the few courts to reject the retaining
lien noted, the lien enforces a lawyer's "right to damage his client's
cause.., unless the client pays him the disputed fees in full and
foregoes his right to honestly litigate the dispute."37
Inflicting disproportionate harm on the client is not an unwanted
by-product of the lien-it is precisely the way the lien is meant to
work. The lawyer usually has no use for impounded documents, and
is forbidden to use impounded funds during the fee dispute.38 The
benefit the lawyer obtains from the lien is the ability to harm the
client until the client settles the fee dispute. And settlement is most
likely to occur when the client faces harm from the lien that is greater
than the fee in dispute.
Courts have been strikingly candid, if not gleeful, in explaining that
inconveniencing clients is "the essence-the power and the bite-of
the attorney's retaining lien" and that reducing the harm "would
emasculate the retaining lien."39 It seems that biting an occasional
client is a small price to pay for preserving the lien's effect. The
purpose of the lien is to provide "leverage over a client,"4 and "the
effectiveness of the lien is proportionate to the inconvenience of the
client in being denied access to his property."'" The lien is even better
when it can be used to obstruct access to the truth: "[W]here the
adversary has access to documents to which the client does not, the
inconvenience to the client is increased, thereby enhancing the value
of the lien."42 Questioning the propriety of this method of collecting
Anthony v. Bitler, 911 F. Supp. 341 (N.D. 111. 1996); Tri-Ex Enters. v. Morgan Guar.
Trust Co., 583 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Rathburn v. Policastro, 703 So. 2d 537
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997). But see Jenkins v. Dist. Court, 676 P.2d 1201 (Colo. 1984)
(stating that a lawyer suing client for fees may be required to produce documents for
inspection); Michael J. Fingar, P.A. v. Braun & May Realty, Inc., 807 So. 2d 202 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (similar). Even if a client litigating with a third party were able
to obtain documents from her former lawyer by discovery, doing so might entitle the
third party to see them and hence waive the protections of the work product doctrine
and attorney-client privilege.
37. Acad. of Cal. Optometrists, Inc. v. Superior Court, 124 Cal. Rptr. 668, 672 (Ct.
App. 1975).
38. E.g., Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.15(c) (2000) (stating that lawyer
must keep separate property in dispute); In re Webster, 776 N.E.2d 1210 (Ind. 2002);
Attorney Grievance Comm. v. Sheridan, 741 A.2d 1143 (Md. 1999); In re Stein, 483
A.2d 109 (N.J. 1984); see also infra note 91.
39. Jenkins v. Weinshienk, 670 F.2d 915, 920 (10th Cir. 1982).
40. Anthony, 911 F. Supp. at 343.
41. Brauer v. Hotel Assocs., Inc., 192 A.2d 831, 835 (N.J. 1963).
42. Tri-Ex Enters. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 583 F. Supp. 1116, 1117-18
(S.D.N.Y. 1984). Accord Pomerantz v. Schandler, 704 F.2d 681, 683 (2d Cir. 1983)
(quoting In re San Juan Gold, Inc., 96 F.2d 60, 61 (2d Cir. 1938)). A bankruptcy court
may require a bankrupt's lawyer to turn over papers covered by a lien, although
security for payment of the underlying fee claim may be required. 11 U.S.C. § 542(e)
(1997); In re Matassini, 90 B.R. 508 (Bankr. Ct. M.D. Fla. 1988).
2004]
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fees for lawyers does not seem to have occurred to such courts,
despite the power and duty of the courts to regulate the bar.43
A recent case demonstrates how retaining liens can operate. A
large firm representing the defendant in a class action was allowed to
withdraw for unstated reasons, and the trial court decided that the
client owed the firm more than $500,000 in legal fees and expenses.
To ensure payment, the law firm kept the client's files.44 Faced with
this situation, the client took about three months to find new counsel
prepared to defend the class action. In the meantime, the plaintiffs in
that action secured a default judgment against the lawyerless client for
more than $22,000,000, which the trial court declined to vacate. Note
that the coercion exerted by the law firm's retaining lien was less
egregious here than in some other cases, because it was based not on a
mere fee claim, but rather on the court's adjudication that the fee was
actually due. Nevertheless, the lien probably contributed to the
default judgment by depriving the client of access to relevant
documents. The default judgment in turn increased the constraint on
the client to find a way to pay the fee in order to mount a more
effective challenge to the default judgment. Faced with the prospect
of losing $22,000,000, the client was under enormous pressure to settle
the fee matter on any terms it could. As it turned out, the client
eventually succeeded in persuading the Court of Appeals to vacate
the default judgment. Other clients, either less determined or less
evasive, 5 simply would have settled the fee claim on whatever terms
they could, freeing them to resist the demand for a default judgment
with the aid of new counsel and unimpounded documents.
In another case, the client was less fortunate, with the Supreme
Court itself administering the final blow. A District Court dismissed
an antitrust case because of the plaintiff's repeated failure to file
adequate answers to interrogatories.46 Part of the plaintiff's excuse
was the unavailability of the case files, withheld by its previous lawyer
who had asserted a retaining lien to enforce his claim to a fee of
$1,000,000. The Court of Appeals upheld that excuse,47 only to be
reversed by the Supreme Court, which concluded that the District
43. See generally Thomas M. Alpert, The Inherent Power of the Courts to Regulate
the Practice of Law: An Historical Analysis, 32 Buff. L. Rev. 525 (1983).
44. Pecarsky v. Galaxiworld.com Ltd., 249 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2001). The law firm
also obtained a court order requiring the client to pay the sum due by a stated date
and restraining it from transferring any funds until it did so, relief that an ordinary
creditor would have been unlikely to secure. Id. at 169.
45. The client in question was apparently not a good guy. See In re Gaming
Lottery Sec. Litig., No. 96 Civ. 5567, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1204, at *14-*18
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2001); Silva Run Worldwide Ltd. v. Gaming Lottery Corp., No. 96
Civ. 3231, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8307, at *3-*17, *30-*31 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2002),
No. 96 Civ. 3231, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5472, at *29-*30 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2003).
46. In re Prof'l Hockey Antitrust Litig., 63 F.R.D. 641 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
47. In re Prof'l Hockey Antitrust Litig., 531 F.2d 1188 (3d Cir. 1976).
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Court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the suit.48 The Court
did not mention the retaining lien that had impeded the plaintiff's
efforts to answer the interrogatories. Whether or not the former
lawyer was ever paid, he could presumably find satisfaction in having
punished his recalcitrant client by extinguishing the very claim he had
been retained to prosecute.
As these examples show, the operation of the retaining lien is often
wholly irreconcilable with the principle that "a lawyer should pursue a
matter on behalf of a client despite opposition, obstruction or
personal inconvenience to the lawyer" and "should act with
commitment and dedication to the interests of the client."49 That
principle does have limits: A lawyer need not serve for nothing a
client who has undertaken to pay. But it is one thing to claim a fee,
and another to menace a client with disaster unless the claimed sum is
paid. Even when a client fails to pay a fee that is actually due, a
lawyer may withdraw from the representation only if the breach is
substantial and the client has received reasonable warning; and failure
to comply with these requirements risks complete forfeiture of the
lawyer's compensation as well as malpractice liability.5 °
By contrast, the rationale of the retaining lien is precisely that
threatening to injure the client will and should enforce the lawyer's
fee claim. The larger the harm facing the client by comparison to the
fee claimed, the more effective the lien. Likewise, the larger the
number of essential papers and the greater the value of client assets
that the lien immobilizes, the more it restricts the client's freedom to
choose a new lawyer, a freedom that other branches of the law seek to
protect.51 It remains only to add that, the more effective the retaining
lien is in these ways, the more unjustifiable it is for lawyers to use it
and for courts to enforce it.
The contradiction between the retaining lien and the ideals of the
legal profession is particularly jarring because of the strong emphasis
that those ideals place on protecting clients' papers and property. The
rules requiring lawyers to safeguard such papers and property and
return them when requested are among the more stringently enforced
of the professional regulations, with violations often leading to
disbarment.52 Except, that is, when a lawyer keeps client property in
order to enforce a fee demand. Then, the ethical rules and the
48. Nat'l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639 (1976).
49. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2000).
50. Id. at R. 1.16(b)(4); Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 31
Reporter's Note cmt. f, § 32 cmt. k, § 37, § 40 cmt. e & Reporter's Note (2000).
51. E.g., Reid, Johnson, Downes, Andrachick & Webster v. Lansberry, 629
N.E.2d 431 (Ohio 1994); In re Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1994); Restatement
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 40 (2000).
52. E.g., Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.15 (2000); In re Wilson, 409 A.2d
1153 (N.J. 1979); Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics 175-84 (1986).
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policies they embody politely step aside, giving precedence to lawyers'
financial interests.53
The limited power of the courts to lift the retaining lien by no
means redeems it. To seek the court's aid, a client who has failed to
pay the fee demanded by one lawyer must first find and pay another
lawyer willing to take the case. If the matter from which the claimed
fee arose is not a pending court proceeding, the client must then
institute a new suit, with further trouble, delay and expense. Except
in very unusual circumstances, the client must also post security for
the claimed fee in order to secure the release of the impounded
papers or property. Mere inability to pay the claimed fee does not
exempt a client from these requirements.54 Meanwhile, the lawyer can
simply sit tight on the papers or property as the lien continues to bite.
Surely this is not a pattern for client-lawyer dealing that the profession
or the courts should continue to endorse.
B. A Thumb on the Scales
The retaining lien shifts the burden of resolving fee disputes from
lawyers to clients. A lawyer who has impounded client property
having sufficient value need not sue the client to recover the claimed
fee. Rather, it is the client who must sue, settle, or lose the use of the
property. This means that an opportunistic lawyer can often force the
client to pay more than the correct fee because the client will be
willing to pay any amount that is less than the cost of removing the
lien by litigation or the cost to the client of doing without the
impounded property. And doing without may be costly indeed when
the impounded property consists of papers that the client cannot
replace elsewhere.
The burden of taking action, which always is hard to bear, raises
special problems for a client disputing a former lawyer's fee demand.
As noted above, such a client must find and pay a new lawyer, who is
likely to be suspicious of a potential client who resists the previous
lawyer's fee claims. A client who has just endured the shipwreck of
one lawyer-client relationship is unlikely to be eager to embark on a
second one. That most of the relevant documents are likely to be
covered by the lien, and therefore unobtainable until the dispute goes
to court, makes the client's plight still harder. In addition, a lawyer
sued by a client may disclose client confidences relevant to the
dispute, perhaps exposing the client to embarrassment or worse.
Some of these burdens may be reduced in the approximately ten
states where clients may compel their lawyers to arbitrate fee
53. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.8(j)(1), 1.15(b) (2000).
54. See supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
55. Authorities cited infra note 74. For a colorful example, see Morganroth &
Morganroth v. DeLorean, 123 F.3d 374 (6th Cir. 1997).
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disputes,56 but at what disillusioned clients may consider the price of
bringing the dispute before a tribunal dominated by other lawyers.
Indeed, simply by asserting a lien a lawyer is likely to deprive the
client of the right to trial by jury in the fee dispute." The client's
choice is then between an arbitrator and a judge exercising summary
jurisdiction.
For a lawyer, by contrast, the burden of litigating a fee dispute is
less than that of other litigants even without the boost of a retaining
lien. The lawyer may be able to represent himself, or turn to another
member of the same firm. At the very least, lawyers will find it easier
than nonlawyers to choose and negotiate with competent counsel.
They will also be more able to assist their counsel. And their legal
sophistication and familiarity with fee matters should have enabled
them to structure the underlying representation and its fee
arrangements so as to facilitate establishment of their fee claims, for
example by creating and preserving documentation. In addition,
lawyers are repeat players in fee disputes, so that they may have an
interest in making clear their willingness to go to court if necessary-
although they also have an interest in avoiding a reputation for
quarreling with clients.58
Giving still more leverage to lawyers by allowing retaining liens
could be justified only were it established that, when lawyers and
clients disagree about fees, the lawyers are usually correct and the
clients wrong. For such a proposition there is no evidence. Lawyers
often tell anecdotes about abusive clients, but clients tell similar
stories about abusive lawyers. Lawyer overbilling does occur.59 When
a lawyer-client relationship ends, both lawyers and clients may
become upset and unreasonable. As one lawyer for a disciplinary
agency has observed:
It has been my experience that lawyers tend to be personally
affronted by being fired and sometimes unfortunately are not
56. See supra note 23.
57. Petition of Rosenman & Colin, 850 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1988); Jarman v. Hale, 731
P.2d 813 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986).
58. See generally Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations
on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 Law. & Soc'y Rev. 95 (1974); Special Issue, Do the
"Haves" Still Come Out Ahead?, 33 Law. & Soc'y Rev. 795 (1999).
59. On lawyer overbilling, see Susan Saab Fortney, Soul for Sale: An Empirical
Study of Satisfaction, Law Firm Culture, and the Effects of Billable Hour
Requirements, 69 U.M.K.C. L. Rev. 239, 246-60, 275-81 (2000); Lisa G. Lerman, Blue-
Chip Bilking: Regulation of Billing and Expense Fraud by Lawyers, 12 Geo. J. Legal
Ethics 205 (1999); William G. Ross, Kicking the Unethical Billing Habit, 50 Rutgers L.
Rev. 2199 (1998); William G. Ross, The Ethics of Hourly Billing by Attorneys, 44
Rutgers L. Rev. 1, 12-22, 92-93 (1991). For instances in which lawyers were
disciplined for misuse of retaining liens, usually the assertion of a lien when no fee
was due, see Thomas G. Fischer, Annotation, Attorney's Assertion of Retaining Lien
as Violation of Ethical Code or Rules Governing Professional Conduct, 69 A.L.R. 4th
974 (1989).
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professional in dealing with those particular clients. This leads to
Bar complaints [about fees].60
Unfortunately for clients, it is not the clients but the lawyers-in
practice, on the bench, or in the legislature-who have written the
retaining lien rules.
The use of retaining liens to disadvantage clients in fee disputes
with lawyers is inconsistent with the logic of lawyers' fiduciary duties,
which is based on clients' need for special protection.61 It is also
inconsistent with the emphasis the legal profession and the legal
system place on removing economic barriers hampering clients' access
to the law.62 Unfortunately, many of the rules meant to protect clients
from lawyers are so arcane that only another lawyer can make them
work. 63 Empirical investigation suggests that most clients who object
to lawyers' bills eventually give in and pay.' The retaining lien makes
this situation still worse.
The imbalance between lawyer and client that the retaining lien
exacerbates strikes hardest at clients with smaller fee disputes, who
are more likely to be poorer clients. When the amount in controversy
in a fee dispute is $100,000, it may well be worthwhile for a client to
retain a new lawyer and start a new proceeding to challenge the
lawyer's demands. Clients who incur bills giving rise to disputes of
this size are likely to be wealthy and sophisticated. But when the
amount in controversy is $5,000, litigation does not pay.65 Placing the
burden of hiring a new lawyer and going to court on the client then
virtually ensures that he or she simply will give in, paying what the
lawyer seeks in order to retrieve impounded papers or property.
60. Robert W. Bare, 10 Most Common Bar Complaints... and How to Avoid
Them, Nev. Law., July 1997, at 5.
61. See Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in Principals and
Agents: The Structure of Business 55 (J. Pratt & R. Zeckhauser ed., 1985); Robert
Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character
and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1045 (1991); Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary
Law, 71 Cal. L. Rev. 795 (1983).
62. E.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (holding that First
Amendment protects lawyer fee advertising); Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773
(1975) (holding that antitrust laws ban minimum fee scales); United Mine Workers of
Am. Dist. 12 v. Ill. State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967) (holding that First
Amendment freedom of association protects union group legal services arrangement);
Legal Services Corporation, 42 U.S.C. § 2996a-1 (2003); Model Rules of Prof'l
Conduct R. 1.5 (2000) (barring unreasonably high fees); Restatement (Third) of the
Law Governing Lawyers §§ 34-42 (2000); Wolfram, supra note 52, at chs. 9, 14-16;
Richard Abel, American Lawyers 127-41 (1989).
63. Stephen Gillers, Caveat Client: How the Proposed Final Draft of the
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers Fails to Protect Unsophisticated
Consumers in Fee Agreements with Lawyers, 10 Geo. J. Legal. Ethics 581 (1997).
64. Eric H. Steele & Raymond T. Nimmer, Lawyers, Clients, and Professional
Regulation, 1976 Am. Bar Found. Res. J. 917, 957-60.
65. See Renner v. Chase Manhattan Bank, No. 98 Civ. 926, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16150, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2000), in which the court suggested to the parties that a
$17,000 fee claim was not worth fighting over.
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C. The Wages of Trust
The legal profession has traditionally encouraged clients to confide
in their lawyers, not just for the profession's benefit, but assertedly to
encourage access to law.66 The more a client responds to this
invitation to trust a lawyer, the more exposed he or she becomes to
the lawyer's retaining lien.
A trusting client will confide relevant documents to his or her
lawyer. Much lawyer and judicial rhetoric emphasizes the importance
of encouraging clients to share their knowledge with lawyers in order
to obtain sound advice and adequate representation.67 For this
reason, a client's confidences must be protected even when he
confesses to a crime and disclosing the confession might help others.6"
Although a client may not bring previously existing documents under
the attorney-client privilege by conveying them to a lawyer,69 the
privilege, the lawyer's duty of confidentiality, and their purpose of
encouraging client confidences are otherwise fully applicable to
documents.7 °
Often, a client must likewise entrust funds to a lawyer in order to
accomplish the purposes of the representation. The law and the legal
profession seek to encourage this through detailed rules requiring
lawyers to set up special trust accounts, preserve accurate records,
provide an accounting when a client so requests, keep client funds
strictly separate from lawyer funds, and promptly disburse funds to
which a client or third party is entitled.7" Some states audit lawyers'
accounts or establish client protection funds for further assurance.72
66. But see Robert A. Burt, Conflict and Trust Between Attorney and Client, 69
Geo. L.J. 1015 (1981) (advocating bringing lawyer-client conflicts into the open);
Douglas E. Rosenthal, Lawyer and Client: Who's In Charge? (1974) (presenting
evidence that active clients get better results than passive ones).
67. E.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) (defining attorney-
client privilege); Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998) (similar);
Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.6 cmts. 1-6 (2000) (regarding duty of
confidentiality); see Wolfram, supra note 52, at 242-47 (1986) (summarizing rationale
and critiques of confidentiality).
68. E.g., State v. Macumber, 544 P.2d 1084 (Ariz. 1976) (holding that privilege
bars lawyer from testifying to deceased client's confession to murder for which
another is on trial); People v. Beige, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798 (Onondaga County Ct. 1975),
affd, 376 N.Y.S.2d 771 (App. Div. 1975), affd, 359 N.E.2d 377 (N.Y. 1976) (holding
that lawyer properly kept secret client's confession to unsolved murders and location
of bodies). But see Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.6(b)(1) (2000) (amended in
2001 to allow disclosure to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily
harm); Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §§ 66, 67 (2000) (stating
that a lawyer may disclose confidences to prevent death or client's crime or fraud).
69. E.g., John W. Strong et al., McCormick on Evidence § 89 (5th ed. 1999).
70. E.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976); Restatement (Third) of the
Law Governing Lawyers §§ 46(1), 59 cmt. b, 69 cmt. j (2000).
71. E.g., Cal. Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 4-100 (1988); N.Y. Code of Prof'l
Responsibility, DR 9-102 (1999); Rules Regulating the Florida Bar R. 4-1.15 (2002);
see also supra note 52 and accompanying text.
72. E.g., N.J. Ct. R. 1:21-6, 1:28-1 (2003); Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary
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The lawyer retaining lien's most stringent effect is reserved for
clients who accept the invitation of the profession and the law by
entrusting documents, funds or other property to their lawyers.
Should a fee dispute arise, their lawyers will then find more to grab.
For the few clients who know about the lien in advance, it thus
operates to discourage desirable conduct. More broadly, the lien
disseminates a message of lawyer hypocrisy and penalizes clients who
trust their lawyers.73
The retaining lien somewhat resembles, but is less defensible than,
the rule that allows lawyers to disclose client confidences when
necessary to collect a fee or defend against a malpractice suit.74 Both
can be attacked as placing lawyer profit before the protection of client
confidences. But the disclosure rule has a justification: When a
controversy between lawyer and client must be adjudicated, finding
out what happened often necessitates proof of what the client and
lawyer communicated to each other. No such necessity justifies the
retaining lien, whose only purpose is to help lawyers collect disputed
fees.
The lien not only punishes trusting clients but gives lawyers
perverse incentives to provide defective service. A lawyer is supposed
to keep a client informed of the progress of a representation;75 but a
lawyer who properly does so by sending a client copies or originals of
important documents thereby reduces the value of the lien that the
lawyer might later assert should a fee dispute arise. A lawyer is
supposed to deliver funds and other property promptly when they are
due;76 but a lawyer who does so reduces the client funds and property
that the lawyer holds and hence reduces the value of the retaining lien
that the lawyer might later wish to assert. Very likely those lawyers
who are the most likely to make unwarranted fee claims are also most
likely to disregard their duties by retaining the papers and property
that could increase the coercive power of their liens.
D. Fruitless Sin
With all its obnoxious features, the retaining lien is not even very
useful in enforcing valid fee claims. It works only in a small group of
claims: those in which the client leaves documents or property of
Enforcement R. 29-30 (1989); Model Rules for Lawyers' Funds for Client Protection
R. 1-19 (2002); Lawyers' Manual on Prof'l Conduct 45:1001-1208 (1997).
73. Cf Abraham S. Blumberg, The Practice of Law as Confidence Game, 1 Law &
Soc'y Rev. 15 (1967).
74. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.6(b)(2) (2000); Restatement (Third) of
the Law Governing Lawyers §§ 64, 65, 83 (2000); Henry D. Levine, Self-Interest or
Self-Defense: Lawyer Disregard of the Attorney-Client Privilege for Profit and
Protection, 5 Hofstra L. Rev. 783 (1977).
75. E.g., Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.4 (2000).
76. Id. at R. 1.15(b).
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significant value with a lawyer; a fee dispute arises while the
documents or property remain in the lawyer's possession; the lawyer is
willing to lose any possibility of again being retained by the client; the
client needs to reclaim the documents or property soon; and the value
of the documents or property to the client is large compared to the
portion of the fee in dispute.
For these reasons, most comprehensive discussions of fee collection
methods for practitioners disregard the retaining lien altogether7 7 or
note that it is usually of little use.78 One, admittedly from a state that
has limited use of the lien, even notes that "good lawyers understand
that retaining liens are for the birds."79  Another comments that
retaining liens "tend to cause more trouble in many instances than
they are worth."8" Authors of such works typically recommend other
ways to collect fees: reaching fee agreements at the outset of a
representation, regular billing and reminders, staying in touch with
clients, and the security devices to be discussed later in this Article.8"
The point can also be made in another way. If the retaining lien did
not already exist, it is highly unlikely that informed clients and lawyers
would create it by contract.8 2 From a lawyer's point of view, a
retaining lien clause would rarely provide any benefit and would also
tend to alienate an informed client. Better methods of collecting fees
are available. From the point of view of a client who was aware of
how a retaining lien works, a lien clause would be like a possible
lightning bolt, unlikely to strike but fatal if it did. Being unable to
diversify this risk over a portfolio of cases, most clients would tend to
be risk-averse and would expect greater concessions in return for such
a clause than lawyers would be willing to offer. Indeed, any lawyer
77. E.g., J. Harris Morgan, How to Draft Bills Clients Rush to Pay (Julie
Tamminen ed., 1995); Edward Poll, Attorney and Law Firm Guide to The Business of
Law (1994); Theda C. Snyder, Running a Law Practice on a Shoestring 9-13 (1997);
Edward Poll, 12 Tips for Collecting Accounts Receivables, Acct. for Law Firms, Nov.
2000, at 1; Brenda Sapino & Diane Burch Beckham, Make Way for the Enforcer, Tex.
Law., July 9, 1990, at 44; Thom Weidlich, Law Firms Try to Get Tougher on Deadbeat
Clients, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 21, 1994, at Al.
78. See Linda J. Ravdin, The Solo's Guide to Collecting Fees, in Flying Solo: A
Survival Guide for the Solo Lawyer 186, 196 (Joel P. Bennett ed., 2d ed. 1994)
("[E]ven if the lien is theoretically available, it may not be very useful."); Comment,
Oregon Attorneys' Liens: Their Function and Ethics, 27 Willamette L. Rev. 891, 899
(1991) (stating that liens serve "only nuisance value"). But see Laurie Berke-Weiss,
Getting Paid: Good Ideas that Work and Are Ethical, in Serving Clients Well:
Avoiding Malpractice and Ethical Pitfalls in the Practice of Law 143, 150-51 (1999)
(mentioning lien briefly but without disapproval).
79. John Freeman, Turning Over "The File," S.C. Law., July/Aug. 1998, at 10. For
South Carolina's restrictions on use of the lien, see In re Tillman, 462 S.E.2d 283 (S.C.
1995).
80. John W. Toothman & William G. Ross, Legal Fees: Law and Management 104
(2003).
81. See supra notes 77-78; infra Part III.
82. But cf. Acad. of Cal. Optometrists, Inc. v. Superior Court, 124 Cal. Rptr. 668
(Ct. App. 1975) (invalidating contractual retaining lien).
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who asked for a retaining lien clause would be likely to awake the
suspicions of an informed client. In short, informed clients and
lawyers would rarely agree ex ante to the clause, even though lawyers
today do sometimes benefit from imposing a lien ex post on a
previously unsuspecting client. In addition, any informed client who
had knowingly accepted a lien clause would have an especial incentive
to frustrate it by keeping property out of the lawyer's hands.
A similar analysis explains why it is no paradox to conclude that the
retaining lien is harmful to clients at the same time as it does little for
lawyers. A lawyer, considered as an economic actor, seeks to
maximize profit. Retaining liens contribute little toward this end
because they work only unpredictably and haphazardly. The lawyer
would be better advised to implement in advance more broadly
effective and less abrasive ways of ensuring payment. But each client
against whom a lawyer deploys a retaining lien suffers harm ranging
from exasperating inconvenience to crushing loss. It is no consolation
to a client that many other clients are not coerced in the same way.
From a broader perspective, the retaining lien reduces lawyer
prosperity because it injects into the lawyer-client relationship a
confrontational approach best confined to dealings with an opposing
party, and often counterproductive even there.83 "Success of legal fee
collection litigation most often carries with it the fallout of lost clients,
additional costs, decreased income, lost opportunities, bad reputation,
and misplaced priorities."' Those who discuss lawyering as a business
find the keys to success in effective marketing, good client relations,
efficient firm management, creative fee arrangements, and quality
services.85 A reputation for grabbing clients' property in order to get
them to pay whatever fee you claim rather than lose the very matter in
which they came to you for help just does not fit into this approach.
In the long run, it is no more good business than it is good ethics.
Lawyers, in short, have no more need of retaining liens than do
members of other professions, who have not found them necessary.
Obstetricians, for example, have no custom of collecting their bills by
refusing to release babies from the hospital.86 "Medical reports should
83. E.g., Robert H. Mnookin et al., Beyond Winning: Negotiating to Create Value
in Deals and Disputes (2000); Jonathan M. Hyman, Trial Advocacy and Methods of
Negotiation: Can Good Trial Advocates Be Wise Negotiators?, 34 U.C.L.A. L. Rev.
863 (1987).
84. Henry W. Ewalt, Through the Client's Eyes: New Approaches to Get Clients
to Hire You Again and Again 67 (1994).
85. E.g., Austin G. Anderson, Marketing Your Practice (1986); Frank Brennan,
Focusing on Profitability (1994); Morgan, supra note 77; Richard C. Reed, Billing
Innovations: New Win-Win Ways to End Hourly Billing (1996); Hollis Hatfield
Weishar, Marketing Success Stories (1997); Strengthening Your Firm: Strategies for
Success (Arthur G. Greene ed., 1997); ABA Committee on Lawyer Business Ethics,
Business and Ethics Implications of Alternative Billing Practices: Report on Alternative
Billing Arrangements, 54 Bus. Law. 175 (1998); supra notes 77-78.
86. Before the abolition of imprisonment for debt, some English solicitors
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not be withheld because of an unpaid bill for medical services,""
although in some states physicians enjoy a lien on a patient's personal
injury claim against a third party,8 and legislation recognizing a
patient's right to inspect and copy medical records contains no
exceptions for unpaid bills.89 Accountants likewise are obliged to
return a client's documents when requested, regardless of a pending
fee claim.9" Nonprofessionals such as automobile mechanics may
often invoke statutory liens, but their situation is distinguishable
because they lack the fiduciary duties that the law recognizes for the
protection of those obliged to place themselves in the hands of
professionals whose performance cannot easily be monitored.9 The
same distinction applies to creditors holding security interests, whose
rights are also set forth in a contract usually arising from an arm's
length transaction.92
III. OTHER WAYS TO PROTECT FEES
The retaining lien is not the only way lawyers can seek to ensure
that their fees will be paid, but are the alternatives any better? Some
of them are. Abolishing the retaining lien would not commit us to
forbidding its superior siblings.
attempted to assert liens on the bodies of their clients, but without success. Whitley
Stokes, A Treatise on the Liens of Attornies, Solicitors, and Other Legal Practitioners
12-13 (1860).
87. American Medical Association Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Code
of Medical Ethics 158 (2002-03 ed.). Accord Person v. Farmers Ins. Group of Cos., 61
Cal. Rptr. 2d 30, 32-33 (Ct. App. 1997).
88. American Medical Association Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, supra
note 87, at 215; see, e.g., Okla. Stat. tit. 42, § 46 (2001); Cirrincione v. Johnson, 703
N.E.2d 67 (Ill. 1998); Nelsen v. Grzywa, 618 N.W.2d 472 (Neb. Ct. App. 2000); Jay M.
Zitter, Annotation, Physicians' and Surgeons' Liens, 39 A.L.R. 5th 787 (1996).
89. E.g., 45 C.F.R. § 164.524 (2003); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 144.335 (West Supp. 2004);
Unif. Health-Care Info. Act, §§ 3-101, 3-102 9 U.L.A. 212, 214-15 (1999); Jonathan P.
Tomes, Healthcare Records Management Disclosure and Retention 301-44 (1993);
see Wheeler v. Comm'r of Soc. Servs., 662 N.Y.S.2d 550 (App. Div. 1997).
90. Perillo, supra note 4, at 470-71.
91. E.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 18-44-101 (Michie 2003) (describing availability of
liens on boats); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 464 (1957); Restatement of
Security § 61 (1941). A mechanic's lien is also usually limited to the property the
mechanic's labor has improved, and is therefore less comparable to the lawyer
retaining lien than to the right to withhold a lawyer's work product for which the
client has not paid, discussed in Part III infra. See, e.g., N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 451-A:1
(2002) (repairing radio or television). Many mechanic's liens also differ from attorney
retaining liens because they are imposed on real property, and until foreclosed do not
prevent the owner from using that property. See, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§
1311.01 to 1311.22 (Anderson 2003). On the controverted desirability of such liens,
see George Lefcoe, Real Estate Transactions 817-19 (2d ed. 1997).
92. See U.C.C. § 9-609 (stating that secured creditor may take possession and sell
collateral when debtor defaults).
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A. The Charging Lien
Because lawyers' retaining and charging liens have similar historical
roots93 and confusingly similar names, it is important to make clear
why the charging lien is a useful institution although the retaining lien
is not.
The charging lien attaches to funds recovered by a lawyer for a
client or in some jurisdictions to the client's claim for such funds.94
With rare exceptions,95 it is invoked by the lawyer for a plaintiff in a
civil action, typically a lawyer retained on a contingent fee. The lien
thus helps make it possible for a plaintiff with no other way of
assuring payment to find counsel. Although some states recognize
common law charging liens,96 most have authorizing statutes, which
may require a contractual lien clause or notice to the court as
conditions for the lien's validity.97
A lawyer may use a charging lien in two ways to help collect a fee.
First, if the funds recovered for the client come into the lawyer's
possession, the lawyer may detain the amount claimed as a fee. This
use has some similarity to a retaining lien, except that the lawyer may
keep only proceeds of the matter in which the fee is claimed,98 and
only the amount so claimed.99 Second, the lawyer may bind the
defendant from whom the property is to be recovered by giving it
proper notice. If the defendant then pays the judgment directly to the
plaintiff, the plaintiff's lawyer may recover his or her fee directly from
93. On the origins of the charging lien, see Welsh v. Hole, 99 E.R. 155 (K.B.
1779); Martin v. Hawks, 15 Johns. 405 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1818); Edward P. Weeks, A
Treatise on Attorneys and Counsellors at Law § 370 (2d ed. 1892).
94. See Ross v. Scannell, 647 P.2d 1004, 1008-09 (Wash. 1982) (stating that lien
does not cover realty).
95. On the availability of a charging lien in some arbitrations, see In re Varat
Enterprises, 81 F.3d 1310 (4th Cir. 1996); E. Mary Laxer Associates, Inc. v. Moredall
Realty Corp., 533 F. Supp. 8 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Mahesh v. Mills, 602 N.W.2d 618 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1999). See also United States v. Fidelity Phila. Trust Co., 459 F.2d 771 (3d
Cir. 1972) (involving a claim to lien on fund obtained through negotiation);
Schroeder, Siegfried, Ryan & Vidas v. Modern Elec. Prods., Inc., 295 N.W.2d 514
(Minn. 1980) (enforcing a lien on "proceeds" of patent application).
96. E.g., Eleazer v. Hardaway Concrete Co., 315 S.E.2d 174 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984);
Stasey v. Stasey, 483 N.W.2d 221 (Wis. 1992) (holding that common law lien survives
statute).
97. Ross, 647 P.2d at 1008; Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §
43 cmts. d, e & Reporter's Note (2000) (citing authority).
98. E.g., Ins. Corp. of Hannover, Inc. v. Latino Americana de Reaseguros, 868 F.
Supp. 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Grayson v. Bank of Little Rock, 971 S.W.2d 788 (Ark.
1998); Erez v. Aigon Taxi, Inc., 679 N.Y.S.2d 143 (App. Div. 1998). Similarly, the
lawyer may not keep property the client already owned. E.g., St. Cloud Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co. v. Brutger, 488 N.W.2d 852 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); Cole, Schotz, Bernstein,
Meisel & Forman, P.A. v. Owens, 679 A.2d 155 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996).
99. People v. Gray, 35 P.3d 611 (Colo. 2001); In re Haar, 698 A.2d 412 (D.C.
1997).
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the defendant. 00 It is also possible that a properly perfected charging
lien will give the lawyer priority over other creditors of the client.'
The charging lien lacks most of the objectionable features of the
retaining lien. Because the charging lien is limited to the amount the
lawyer claims as a fee, its assertion rarely threatens harm to the client
disproportionate to that amount. Rather than depriving the client of
property the client may well have owned before letting the lawyer
hold it, the charging lien simply withholds from the client some part of
what the lawyer has helped the client recover. A charging lien's
impact on the client is hence likely to be less than that of a retaining
lien.l0 ' The charging lien does not punish a client for entrusting
papers or property to a lawyer. And, rather than providing an
incentive for lawyers to keep clients uninformed and to delay
transferring property to them, the charging lien encourages lawyers to
maximize clients' recovery: the larger the recovery, the larger the fee
(at least in contingent fee cases) and the more the property to which
the lien can attach.
One objection to the retaining lien does apply to the charging lien.
By asserting such a lien, a lawyer makes it more likely that a client will
have to sue him, rather than waiting for the lawyer to sue for his fee.
The charging lien thus makes fee disputes more burdensome for
clients, who are already likely to find them more burdensome than do
lawyers. Yet this effect is limited. Because the lawyer who asserts the
charging lien may impound only a sum equal to the lawyer's fee claim,
and because this sum has never been in the client's possession, the
client is under less pressure to settle or sue than are many victims of
the retaining lien. And, because the lawyer asserting the charging lien
may detain the sum in dispute but not spend it,"0 3 that lawyer may
have to bring a fee suit if the client does not go to court first.
As with retaining liens, the client may be able to reduce the burden
of litigation through fee arbitration or through the court's power to
resolve the fee dispute summarily." In addition, charging liens are
most significant in cases where the lawyer asserting the lien is replaced
by another during a pending action and wishes to ensure payment
when the action is tried or settled. In such situations, if the two
100. E.g., Potter v. Schtesser Co., 63 P.3d 1172 (Or. 2003); Schneider, Kleinick,
Weitz, Damashek & Shoot v. City of New York, 754 N.Y.S.2d 220 (App. Div. 2002);
Levin v. Gulf Ins. Group, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 228 (Ct. App. 1999); 2 Robert L. Rossi,
Attorneys' Fees 288-89 (2d ed. 1995).
101. E.g., In re Hagen, 922 F.2d 742 (11th Cir. 1991); Wolf v. Sherman, 682 A.2d
194 (D.C. 1996); see supra note 18.
102. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 113 (1996).
103. People v. Gray, 35 P.3d 611 (Colo. 2001); In re Haar, 698 A.2d at 412; In re
Conduct of Starr, 952 P.2d 1017 (Or. 1998). This is also true in the case of a retaining
lien. See supra note 38.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 22-23.
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lawyers cannot work out a fee settlement, the court before which the
action is already pending may impose a solution in order to speed the
litigation." 5
In situations involving replacement counsel, the charging lien might
appear to cause another problem. Former counsel's lien may make it
harder for the client to afford new counsel. But the problem here is
not the charging lien but the fee that it helps collect. So long as the
client owes one lawyer a fee, whether or not it is backed by a lien, the
client will face difficulties in finding the resources to retain a second
lawyer. The solution to this problem is hence to be found through fee
regulation, not lien regulation. Thus, in contingent fee cases, many
states now protect the client's ability to change counsel by ruling that
the first lawyer's right to a fee does not accrue until the contingency
occurs, and even then is limited to the lower of the contractual fee and
the fair value of the lawyer's services.1"6 Similar formulas have been
applied in non-contingent fee cases. 7
All in all, the charging lien performs a function useful to lawyers
and even to clients, without exacting an unreasonable price. It should
be accompanied by safeguards, 18 but not abolished.
B. Other Fee Collection Techniques
It would be pointless to give a complete list of fee collection
methods. Some, such as selling or financing law firm accounts
receivables, are still being developed.0 9 Others such as prompt and
regular billing or keeping in touch with clients raise few problems.
Still others fall in the broad realm of sleazy collection methods that
lawyers have occasionally used.' This discussion will therefore focus
on three important collection techniques.
105. E.g., Butler, Fitzgerald & Potter v. Sequa Corp., 250 F.3d 171 (2d Cir. 2001);
K.E.C. v. C.A.C., 661 N.Y.S.2d 715 (Sup. Ct. 1997); see Joseph Brenner Assocs., Inc.
v. Starmaker Entm't, Inc., 82 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 1996).
106. E.g., Rosenberg v. Levin, 409 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 1982); Reid, Johnson, Downes,
Andrachik & Webster v. Lansberry, 629 N.E.2d 431 (Ohio 1994).
107. Provanzano v. Nat'l Auto Credit. Inc., 10 F. Supp. 2d 44 (D. Mass. 1998);
Olsen & Brown v. Englewood, 889 P.2d 673 (Colo. 1995); see Cohen v. Radio-
Electronics Officers Union, 679 A.2d 1188 (N.J. 1996); Restatement (Third) of the
Law Governing Lawyers § 40 (2000).
108. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 43(2), (3) (2000)
(requiring written lien contract, lawyer's duty not to impede resolution of fee
disputes, power of court where action pending to prevent abuse).
109. See generally Cadle Co. v. Schlichtmann, 267 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2001); ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 320 (1968); Assoc. of the Bar
of the City of New York, Ethics Op. 1995-1 (1995).
110. E.g., In re Nelson, 327 N.W.2d 576 (Minn. 1982) (involving a lawyer who made
groundless charges against client to tax officials); In re Jaffe, 623 N.Y.S.2d 615 (App.
Div. 1995) (involving a lawyer who tried to collect fees through improper direct
communications after entering into fee settlement); In re Boelter, 985 P.2d 328
(Wash. 1999) (involving a lawyer who falsely claimed to have recorded damaging
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1. Advance Payment
Advance payment must be the most common, and very likely the
most effective, of collection methods. It can take various forms,
notably complete payment of a lump sum fee or a deposit against
hourly charges, refreshed when it is used up. Obviously, advance
payment can only be used with clients who have money or the ability
to raise it.
Requiring prepayment gives clients clear (painfully clear) notice at
the outset of representations of the financial impact of their fee
arrangements. This distinguishes prepayment from the retaining lien,
which works best when a lawyer can spring it on an unsuspecting
client, and from other arrangements known only to clients who read
the fine print of contracts with lawyers. Because the client is aware of
the request for prepayment, lawyer and client may negotiate about
whether prepayment is necessary and what its terms should be.
Clients with sufficient access to funds to make prepayment an option
are likely to be more sophisticated and assertive than other clients, so
the possibility of negotiation is more than an economist's fantasy.
Strengthening the current feeble requirements for advance disclosure
of fee arrangements11 would further increase the likelihood of
negotiation.
In other respects as well, prepayment is free of defects that attend
the retaining lien. Prepayment has no tendency to penalize clients for
trusting their lawyers, except in the sense that a distrustful client
might not accept a prepayment arrangement to begin with. Nor does
prepayment inflict disproportionate harm on clients to coerce them to
settle fee disputes.
Paying in advance, however, can exert excessive pressure to settle
on clients if the amount paid is more than the fee turns out to be. A
client may be willing to pay a lawyer's excessive fee claim just to get
back the remainder of his or her deposit. How often this occurs is
hard to say. I suspect that relatively few lawyers dare to ask for
prepayments or refreshers much larger than their fees turn out to be.
It is more likely that they underestimate what they will charge. In any
event, asking for clearly excessive prepayment should be, and perhaps
is, a disciplinary violation.!1 2
A related problem is that prepayment may be accompanied by
various contractual provisions designed to let the lawyer keep the
payment even though the lawyer-client relationship comes to an
untimely end. The result may be overcharging as well as
inappropriate discouragement of a client's exercise of the right to
admissions by client); Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 41
(2000).
111. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.5(b) (2000); see Gillers, supra note 63.
112. In re Jaffe, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 615.
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change counsel. The solution to this problem is regulation of this kind
of fee provision. Some states forbid at least some such provisions as
"nonrefundable retainers.""' Others nullify them when they amount
to unreasonable fees for what the lawyer undertakes to do,'1 4 or when
they do not adequately notify clients of nonrefundability." 5 If a
representation comes to an end, a lawyer must refund any unearned
fees-and that includes fees claimed under an invalid fee provision.
1 1 6
Like both retaining and charging liens, prepayment arrangements
tend to shift the burden of initiating litigation onto the client, who
must go to court to recover any excess of the funds held by the lawyer
over the correct fee. This burden is mitigated in ways already
mentioned: The lawyer may keep only the amount claimed and must
segregate it until the fee dispute is resolved, and the client may be
able to procure summary court adjudication or in some states compel
the lawyer to arbitrate.117 It would be useful to require the lawyer to
initiate a fee determination procedure within a stated period after the
fee dispute arises, unless the client agrees to an extension. 8
Although prepayment does raise problems, on balance its simplicity
and usefulness and the opportunity to negotiate its terms justify its
legitimacy. So long as lawyers are required to keep client funds in
separate trustee accounts but clients are not, it would be hard to
warrant prohibition of payment in advance. Prepayment should be
improved but not abolished.
2. Mortgaging Client Property
When a client has no liquid assets and seeks a lawyer in a matter
that will not give rise to monetary recovery, mortgaging the client's
land or placing a security interest on other property may make it
easier for the client to retain counsel. Unlike some other fee
collection methods, this one does not always shift the burden of
initiating litigation. The client may stay in possession until the lawyer
institutes and secures relief in a foreclosure proceeding. But most
113. In re Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1994); Cuyahoga County Bar Ass'n
v. Okocha, 697 N.E.2d 594 (Ohio 1998). Compare Lester Brickman & Lawrence A.
Cunningham, Nonrefundable Retainers: Impermissible Under Fiduciary, Statutory and
Contract Law, 57 Fordham L. Rev. 149 (1988), with Steven Lubet, The Rush to
Remedies: Some Conceptual Questions About Nonrefundable Retainers, 73 N.C. L.
Rev. 271 (1994).
114. In re Sather, 3 P.3d 403 (Colo. 2000); Restatement (Third) of the Law
Governing Lawyers § 34 cmt. e & Reporter's Note (2000) (citing authority); id. § 40.
115. Id. § 38(3)(c) cmt. g & Reporter's Note (citing authority).
116. In re Sather, 3 P.3d at 403; Haskins v. Bell, 129 N.W.2d 390 (Mich. 1964);
Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.16(d) (2000).
117. See supra text accompanying notes 22-23, 38.
118. See Comm. on Prof'l Responsibility and Prof'l Discipline, A Suggestion for a
More Equitable Retaining Lien, 54 Rec. Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York 180
(1999) (making similar proposal for retaining liens).
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states allow contractual clauses giving mortgagees a power of sale
when default occurs.' 19
Unfortunately, foreclosure can inflict disproportionate harm on the
client. The lawyer recovers at most the sum due unless he or she buys
the property at the foreclosure sale and later resells it at a profit. If
the property is worth more than the lawyer's fee, its sale in the
foreclosure proceedings should yield a surplus payable to the client.
But foreclosure sales tend to yield less than the market value of the
property, and involve costs that will be paid out of the proceeds.120 A
client who cannot find cash or another buyer thus faces considerable
pressure to settle the fee dispute on whatever terms the lawyer will
accept.
Mortgage and security interest arrangements also have a
considerable potential for abusing a client's trust, albeit not in the
same way as retaining liens. They involve complex contractual
provisions that many clients will find hard to understand, and may
simply accept on a lawyer's word. The clients who are likely to need
to offer mortgage security to retain a lawyer are likely to be relatively
unsophisticated, and almost certain not to hire a second lawyer to
explain the mortgage agreement. The lawyer's duty to explain such
provisions conflicts with the lawyer's interest in keeping the bad news
from a client. Once the arrangement goes into effect, moreover, it
may create further conflicts of interest between the lawyer and the
client. The lawyer, for example, might wish to schedule the matter in
which he or she was retained to be able to foreclose at the moment
most propitious for him, or might wish to handle the matter so as to
maximize the chances of foreclosing.
For these reasons, mortgage and security interest agreements
providing security for fees are regulated as business transactions
between lawyer and client. The lawyer must be able to show that the
agreement was fair and reasonable to the client, and that the client
consented to it in writing after receiving full disclosure of the terms
and problems of the arrangement as well as an opportunity to seek
independent advice. 21 Otherwise, the lawyer is subject to professional
119. 1 Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Real Estate Finance Law 580-81, 609-
13 (3d ed. 1994).
120. Basil H. Mattingly, The Shift from Power to Process: A Functional Approach
to Foreclosure Law, 80 Marq. L. Rev. 77 (1996); Philip Shuchman, Profit on Default:
An Archival Study of Automobile Repossession and Resale, 22 Stan. L. Rev. 20 (1969);
Steven Wechsler, Through the Looking Glass: Foreclosure by Sale as De Facto Strict
Foreclosure-An Empirical Study of Mortgage Foreclosure and Subsequent Resale, 70
Cornell L. Rev. 850 (1985); see Luize E. Zubrow, Rethinking Article 9 Remedies:
Economic and Fiduciary Perspectives, 42 UCLA L. Rev. 445 (1994). But see Debra
Pogrund Stark, Facing the Facts: An Empirical Study of the Fairness and Efficiency of
Foreclosures and a Proposal for Reform, 30 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 639 (1997).
121. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.8(a) (2000); ABA Standing Comm. on
Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 02-427 (2002).
2004]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
discipline,122 and the client may rescind the agreement. 23 These
restrictions contrast strikingly with a lawyer's freedom to impose a
retaining lien, even in the absence of a contract so providing,
disclosure to the client, or a showing of fairness.
Lawmakers should add at least one more restriction. A lawyer
should be allowed to include a mortgage or security interest provision
in a fee agreement 124 only when a reasonable client might have chosen
to accept such an arrangement. 125  Only when that is so can the
arrangement be considered fair and reasonable to the client, as
required by law.126 When a mortgage or security interest provision
meets this standard, it will usually be because the client had no other
reasonable method of securing a paid lawyer's services. In such a
situation, invalidating the provision would harm clients. In other
situations, a provision might be upheld if it were superior to available
alternatives, such as arrangements offered by other lawyers of
comparable qualifications. And when a client is sophisticated, as in
the case of a corporation with house counsel, it should be free to
consent to almost any fee or financing arrangement. 127  It is the
unsophisticated clients who face loss of their homes as a result of an
overreaching fee security arrangement.
3. Litigation and Arbitration
A lawyer's right to sue a client for fees, traditionally rejected as
below the dignity of legal professions in some nations, has been
recognized in the United States for almost two centuries. 28 Clients
122. Hawk v. State Bar of Cal., 754 P.2d 1096 (Cal. 1988); In re Taylor, 741 N.E.2d
1239 (Ind. 2001); In re Snyder, 35 S.W.3d 380 (Mo. 2000), modified on denial of reh'g,
No. SC82299 (Mo. Feb. 13, 2001); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Levin, 517 N.E.2d
892 (Ohio 1988).
123. Duvall v. Laws, Swain & Murdoch, P.A., 797 S.W.2d 474 (Ark. Ct. App. 1990);
Petit-Clair v. Nelson, 782 A.2d 960 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); Cotton v.
Kronenberg, 44 P.3d 878 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002); see John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J.
Peroni, The Decline in Lawyer Independence: Lawyer Equity Investments in Clients,
81 Tex. L. Rev. 405,444-58 (2002).
124. Different considerations apply when a client gives a mortgage after a
representation ends, as security for a settlement of the fee dispute. See Twachtman v.
Hastings, 1997 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2014 (Super. Ct. 1997).
125. Cf Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 18 cmt. e (2000)
(stating similar requirement for lawyer-client contracts entered during a
representation).
126. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.8(a)(1) (2000).
127. E.g., Ryan v. Butera, Beausang, Cohen & Brennan, 193 F.3d 210 (3d Cir.
1999); Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison v. Telex Corp., 602 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1979) (per
curiam); see Richard W. Painter, Rules Lawyers Play By, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 665, 706-
07 (2001).
128. See John Leubsdorf, Man In His Original Dignity: Legal Ethics in France 16-
23 (2001); supra notes 6-17 and accompanying text.
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may likewise sue lawyers to recover excessive fees that they have
paid. 129
Although litigation must remain available to adjudicate fee
disputes, and although it lacks the special disadvantages of the
retaining lien, it brings with it expense and delay. As already
mentioned, its burdens are heavier for a client who has lost a former
lawyer than for a lawyer more accustomed to legal matters, despite
the law that places on lawyers the burden of persuasion for many
disputed facts in fee litigations.13 Fee litigation may also bring
publicity harmful to both parties. The lawyer may disclose lurid client
confidences relevant to the dispute,"' while the client may bring a
malpractice counterclaim against the lawyer.132
Clients and lawyers can seek to avoid these problems by agreeing to
arbitrate after a fee dispute arises,133 and some jurisdictions enforce
predispute arbitration clauses in retainer agreements.134 As already
mentioned, at least ten jurisdictions compel lawyers to arbitrate fee
disputes when a client wishes;'35 many more sponsor voluntary fee
arbitration for clients and lawyers who choose to rely on them.'36
Methods for resolving fee disputes out of court are also commonplace
in foreign legal systems.137
Fee arbitration may be a mixed blessing for clients. It does provide
more privacy than litigation. It may also be cheaper, at least when
conducted by court or bar programs that provide volunteer arbitrators
without charge. The rub is that these arbitrators are likely to be
129. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 42(1) & Reporter's
Note (2000) (citing authority).
130. Id. § 42(2) cmt. c & Reporter's Note (citing authority); see Cooter &
Freedman, supra note 61.
131. See supra note 74. For a dramatic example, see Morganroth & Morganroth v.
DeLorean, 123 F.3d 374 (6th Cir. 1997).
132. E.g., Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy v. Boon, 13 F.3d 537 (2d Cir. 1994);
Tom Riley Law Firm, P.C. v. Glass, 620 N.W.2d 252 (Iowa 2000); 1 Ronald E. Mallen
& Jeffrey M. Smith, Legal Malpractice 164-70, 193-95 (5th ed. 2000).
133. E.g., Harkleroad v. Stringer, 499 S.E.2d 379 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998).
134. ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 02-425
(2002); Matthew J. Clark, Note, The Legal and Ethical Implications of Pre-Dispute
Agreements Between Attorneys and Clients to Arbitrate Fee Disputes, 84 Iowa L. Rev.
827 (1999).
135. See supra note 23.
136. See Wolfram, supra note 52, at 556-58; Jonathan Lippman, Welcome Fee
Dispute Arbitration Program: Long-troublesome Area Is Addressed, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 22,
2001, at S1 (stating that 46 states have arbitration programs of one sort or another, 35
of them statewide).
137. E.g., Solicitors' (Non-Contentious Business) Remuneration Order 1994,
(1994) SI 1994/2616; Andrew Boon & Jennifer Levin, The Ethics and Conduct of
Lawyers in England and Wales 300-02 (1999) (noting that procedures are costly for
clients and rarely used); Fisch, supra note 8, at 9-165. In nations that prescribe fee
tariffs, there may be less room for dispute. See id. at 9-146 to 9-153; Marianne Roth,
Towards Procedural Economy: Reduction of Duration and Costs of Civil Litigation in
Germany, 20 Civ. Just. Q. 102, 120-24 (2001).
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lawyers or friends of lawyers. Clients may reasonably fear that the
arbitrators will tend to side with lawyers. 138  Some clients might
therefore prefer trying a fee dispute in court, where there is usually a
right to jury trial,139 or at least bringing it before a judge exercising
summary jurisdiction.140
I conclude that those jurisdictions that allow clients but not lawyers
to compel fee arbitration have reached the correct result. But we
know virtually nothing about how fee arbitration actually works. Do
clients with fee disputes know about it? How long does it take? How
much does it cost? How many clients use lawyers to present their
cases, and what difference does that make in the result? How do
arbitrators resolve disputes of fact? Do they correctly apply the law
of attorney fees? Empirical research is badly needed. Regulating fee
collection methods can do only limited good if the procedures for
adjudicating fee disputes are inadequate.
IV. ABOLITION AND BEYOND
Should the lawyer retaining lien be reformed or abolished? If it is
abolished, just what documents will clients be entitled to retrieve from
their lawyers? What should be the status of unpaid-for work product?
We must consider these questions to reach an improvement over
current law.
A. Halfway Measures
An infinite number of compromises lie between present law and the
total abolition of lawyer retaining liens. Here, I will discuss a few of
them, finding them generally unsatisfactory with the exception of
certain contractual liens.
1. Statutory Liens
Considered as a recommendation of what the law should be, there
is nothing to be said for the Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers' provision that retaining liens should be allowed when
authorized by statute or rule but not otherwise.4 Whether a lien
138. See Lester Brickman, Attorney-Client Fee Arbitration: A Dissenting View, 1990
Utah L. Rev. 277; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the "Haves" Come out Ahead in
Alternative Judicial Systems?: Repeat Players in ADR, 15 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol.
19 (1999); Alan Scott Rau, Resolving Disputes Over Attorneys' Fees: The Role of
ADR, 46 SMU L. Rev. 2005, 2050-57 (1993).
139. Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221 (1963); Jarman v. Hale, 731 P.2d 813 (Idaho Ct.
App. 1986); 2 Edward M. Thornton, A Treatise on Attorneys at Law 960-61 (1914).
But see Revson v. Cinque & Cinque, P.C., No. 97 Civ. 9236, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
514 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2001); Ginberg v. Tauber, 678 A.2d 543 (D.C. 1996); In re
LiVolsi, 428 A.2d 1268 (N.J. 1981).
140. See supra note 22.
141. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §43(1) (2000).
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derives from legislation or from precedent does not affect its merits.
The author of this Article must confess that, in his capacity as
Associate Reporter of the Restatement, he agreed to the distinction,
fearing that otherwise the lien's condemnation might be abandoned
altogether. 14 2 Presumably those who sought the compromise believed
that half a lien is better than none, or that Restatements should
restate precedents but not legislation. In any event, lawmakers should
be suspicious of the retaining lien regardless of whether they sit in the
legislature, on the bench, or on a rulemaking committee.
2. Contractual Liens
The strongest case for allowing a retaining lien concerns a lien
accepted in advance by a client who otherwise would not be able to
secure adequate legal representation; yet instances in which a lien
makes the difference between ability and inability to retain counsel
must be rare or nonexistent. The situation would have to be one in
which: (a) the client has no present or future assets that could be used
to guaranty payment but is nevertheless likely to become able in the
future to pay the lawyer; (b) the representation will not yield proceeds
subject to a charging lien, or lawyer work product that can be withheld
if not paid for representation143 but is nevertheless likely to leave
lienable client assets in the lawyer's possession; and (c) the client
cannot be trusted to pay without compulsion, but can nevertheless be
trusted not to evade the lien clause by keeping property out of the
lawyer's possession even though he or she is aware of that clause.
When a contractual retaining lien is not essential for a client to
retain counsel, a lawyer and client might still prefer it to other security
arrangements, but this too provides only dubious justification for lien
contracts. As already explained, informed clients and lawyers would
rarely agree in advance to a contractual retaining lien that provides
lawyers with only haphazard benefits while threatening clients with
substantial harm.1" Lawyers, however, might well be able to obtain
the advantage of springing a lien on an unsuspecting client by
including a lien clause among the numerous provisions of a retainer
agreement. Clients might sign the agreement without having read the
lien clause or understanding its significance, or out of trust that their
lawyers would safeguard their interests. Lawyers, after all, are
fiduciaries for their clients precisely because clients need special
protection against overreaching by lawyers. The reasons for that
protection-the difficulty of monitoring a lawyer's performance, the
142. See American Law Institute, 69th Annual Meeting: Proceedings 1992, at 529-
33 (1993) (implementing earlier agreement to recognize statutory liens in the black
letter).
143. On charging liens, see supra Part III.A. On a lawyer's right to keep work
product for which the client has not paid, see infra Part IV.C.
144. See supra Part II.D.
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importance to clients of the matters confided to lawyers, and lawyers'
ability to use the law for their own advantage-squarely apply to the
creation of retaining liens. 45 The same reasons counsel against too
great a willingness to allow lawyers to contract out of client
protections.146
Freedom of contract should vanquish these considerations when
clients really do make knowing decisions to accept retaining lien
contracts. That would be the case for corporate clients with house
counsel and for clients receiving independent advice on their retainer
agreements.147 Perhaps lien contracts should also be recognized to the
same extent as business transactions between lawyers and clients,
since both involve lawyer-client conflicts of interest, waiver of client
rights, and complex transactions that a client may not understand.
Accepting that approach would require a lawyer seeking to uphold a
lien contract to bear the burden of showing that the contract was fair
and reasonable to the client in the sense that the client had grounds
for accepting the lien clause, that the client received full disclosure of
the operation and risks of the clause, that the client was given a
reasonable opportunity to obtain independent advice, and that the
client consented in writing after receiving in writing the terms of the
arrangement.'48 Beyond that point, claims of client agreement should
not validate retaining lien provisions.
3. Case by Case Consideration
South Carolina's modification of the traditional retaining lien
allows lawyers to assert a lien only after balancing a number of
factors, including whether the client has clearly agreed to pay the fee,
whether the client is able to pay, what less stringent means of
enforcement are enforceable, and what prejudice the lien might
cause.149  Although this reform is better than none at all, it
underestimates the ability of lawyers to persuade themselves that the
balance tips in their favor. 5 ' The lawyers most likely to abuse the lien
145. See authorities cited supra note 61.
146. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 19 (2000). For
arguments supporting contracting out with varying degrees of enthusiasm, see Frank
H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & Econ.
425 (1993); Painter, supra note 127; Fred C. Zacharias, Limits on Client Autonomy in
Legal Ethics Regulation, 81 B.U. L. Rev. 199 (2001).
147. On independent advice requirements, see In re Mercer, 652 P.2d 130 (Ariz.
1982); Goldman v. Kane, 329 N.E.2d 770 (Mass. App. Ct. 1975); Painter, supra note
127, at 706-07; Zacharias, supra note 146, at 216. For cases upholding fee contracts of
independently represented corporations, see supra note 127.
148. See Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.8(a) (2000); supra text accompanying
notes 121-23.
149. In re An Anonymous Member of S.C. Bar, 335 S.E.2d 803 (S.C. 1985). See
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Informal Op. 80-1461 (1980)
(urging lawyers to consider similar factors in deciding whether to assert a lien).
150. See In re Tillman, 462 S.E.2d 283 (S.C. 1995) (lawyer reprimanded for
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to begin with are also those most likely to continue asserting it under
the South Carolina approach. And when the lawyer's need to assert a
lien does outweigh any resulting harm to the client, the lien will
probably not have much effect in any event. The client will simply
abide the relatively small harm that the lien inflicts. This is why courts
observe that the lien works precisely by threatening harm to the
client. 1 ' Hence, the already quoted observation of a South Carolina
lawyer that "retaining liens are for the birds."'15 2 Forbidding assertion
of a retaining lien against a client who is unable to pay 53 might
likewise prevent some abuse, but some lawyers will easily persuade
themselves that clients can pay. And if the client is really unable to
pay, why would a rational lawyer bother to assert a lien to begin with?
4. Liens on Certain Kinds of Assets
A more promising reform would exclude client documents and
evidentiary material from the scope of the retaining lien, limiting it to
money and other valuables. 5 4  This would eliminate the most
egregious use of the lien, in which a lawyer uses the documents a
client has confided to him to obstruct the client in the very matter in
which the lawyer was retained to assist. Yet a lawyer's seizure of
money is also capable of imposing disproportionate pressure on a
client to settle a fee dispute, of shifting to the client the burdens of
litigation, and of punishing the client's willingness to entrust
possession of the money to the lawyer. In addition, once documents
are eliminated from the lien's reach, what remains of the lien will have
few valid uses. If the money or valuables subject to the lien have been
obtained for the client through the lawyer's efforts, a retaining lien is
not needed because a charging lien will do the job in a less
objectionable way. 55 If not, it is highly likely that the funds were
entrusted to the lawyer for some specific purpose such as use in a
transaction, and hence, are not subject to a retaining lien in any
asserting lien on basis of excessive fee claim; lawyer had himself filed charges against
successor counsel for "claim jumping"); In re White, 492 S.E.2d 82 (S.C. 1997) (lawyer
reprimanded for violations including assertion of lien on basis of fee claim never
presented to client).
151. See supra text accompanying notes 39-42.
152. See supra text accompanying note 79.
153. D.C. Rules Prof'l Conduct R. 1.8(i) (2003); In re An Anonymous Member of
S.C. Bar, 335 S.E.2d at 803.
154. See D.C. Rules Prof'l Conduct R. 1.8(i) (2003) (limiting liens on documents
but not on other property); Mass. Rules Prof'l Conduct R. 1.16(e) (2001) (limiting
liens on documents, but not mentioning other property); Acad. of Cal. Optometrists,
Inc. v. Superior Court, 124 Cal. Rptr. 668, 671 n. 4 (Ct. App. 1975) (expressing no
opinion on retaining liens on property of pecuniary value but rejecting liens on
documents). However, there is no clear authority on whether retaining liens on
property have ever existed in Massachusetts or California.
155. See supra Part III.A.
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event.156 And if the funds have reached the lawyer pursuant to a fee
agreement, the lawyer may hold them during a bona fide fee dispute
even without a retaining lien.
5. Abolition
In short, abolishing the lawyer retaining lien altogether is the ideal
solution. The lien's effectiveness is inextricably linked to its egregious
characteristics, it rarely makes sense as a collection method, and
lawyers may use several preferable ways to ensure payment of their
fees. At most, lawyers should be allowed to enter into written
retaining lien contracts with clients enjoying independent
representation or in other special circumstances. As we will now see,
however, abolishing the retaining lien brings other issues into view.
B. Client Rights in Lawyer Files
A lawyer who can no longer rely on a retaining lien to justify
keeping documents and other property relating to a client may still
argue that the client was in any event not entitled to get the property.
Professional rules require a lawyer to give a client "papers and
property to which the client is entitled" when a representation ends,157
but do not state just what those are.
In approaching this issue, one must distinguish documents from
money and other items of pecuniary value. So far as money and the
like is concerned, the lawyer is not much different from any other
bailee or agent, and ordinary property and contract law provides
usable principles for determining who is entitled to what. The
lawyer's obligation is to deliver property to the person entitled to it,
and in case of dispute to hold the property pending the dispute's
resolution, on pain of being held liable to the person who turns out to
be entitled.158 Thus the lawyer must decide whether a third party
claimant has a property interest, such as a lien, in the property the
lawyer holds, in which case the lawyer must honor that interest, 5 9 or
rather has a contractual or other claim against the client, in which case
the lawyer should transfer the property to the client."6
Documents raise different issues, even on the assumption-which
will for the present be adopted-that the client has paid all fees to
156. See supra text accompanying notes 29-30.
157. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.16(d) (2000).
158. Id. R. 1.15 (1983); Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 45
(2000).
159. E.g., Leon v. Martinez, 638 N.E.2d 511 (N.Y. 1994) (holding that a lawyer was
liable for paying to client proceeds that client had validly assigned to another).
160. E.g., Farmer Ins. Exch. v. Zerin, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 707 (Ct. App. 1997) (holding
that a lawyer was not liable for paying funds to client when insurer had a claim against
a client but no lien).
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which the lawyer is entitled. 6' What originals or copies the client
should be entitled to receive can hardly be resolved by reference to
property law, which yields no clear answers. Is the owner of a
document the person who paid for the paper, the person whose pen or
printer placed words on it, or the person who formulated the words or
shaped the ideas; or must some combination of these factors be
employed? More importantly, issues of ownership can arise in
different contexts calling for different solutions. For example,
whether the lawyer or client should be able to reap the profits of
selling copies of a legal analysis that the former has written for the
latter is an issue quite distinct from what originals or copies a client
should be able to retrieve after a representation ends.'62
The factors that should be decisive in determining the client's rights
are the lawyer's duty to provide the client with all relevant
information relating to the representation and the lawyer's duty to
promote the client's interests through lawful and proper means.'63
There might sometimes be some countervailing consideration, such as
a lawyer's duty not to disclose confidences of another client. In the
absence of such considerations, a lawyer should make files available
for copying to clients wishing to see them, and should provide clients
with original documents that are of use to them. The authorities
generally support this approach. 6
Most of the case law has arisen when a client-or a liquidator or
trustee in bankruptcy standing in the client's shoes-is considering a
malpractice suit against a lawyer who formerly represented that client.
This is a trying situation for the lawyer, who has no wish to
collaborate in his or her own destruction, and is likely to view the
former client's complaints as unfounded, irrational, and greedy.
Nevertheless, the duty to inform a client comprehends even the duty
to disclose information that the client can use against the informing
lawyer.'65 Once the malpractice action is filed, the client will be able
161. This assumption will be relaxed in infra Part IV.C.
162. On the former issue, see, for example, Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v.
Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989) (discussing copyright "work made for hire" doctrine);
Kevin Hopkins, Law Firms, Technology, and The Double-Billing Dilemma, 12 Geo. J.
Legal Ethics 95 (1998).
163. E.g., Model Rules of Prof'l Responsibility R. 1.1-4 (2000); Restatement
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §§ 16, 20 (2000); see Restatement (Second) of
Agency §§ 381, 385, 387 (1958) (discussing agent's duty to inform, obey, and act for
benefit of principal).
164. E.g., Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers v. Henry, 581 S.E.2d 37 (Ga. 2003);
Ashcraft & Gerel v. Shaw, 728 A.2d 798 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999); Sage Realty
Corp. v. Proskauer Rose Goetz & Mendelsohn LLP, 689 N.E.2d 879 (N.Y. 1997);
Crawford v. Logan, 656 S.W.2d 360 (Tenn. 1983); Restatement (Third) of the Law
Governing Lawyers § 46 (2000); see Unif. Health-Care Info. Act, §§3-101, 3-102 9
U.L.A. 212, 214-15 (1999) (applying a similar approach to medical records). On who
pays the copying charges, see N.D. Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.19(d), (f) (2003); In
re X.Y., 529 N.W.2d 688 (Minn. 1995); Averill v. Cox, 761 A.2d 1083 (N.H. 2000).
165. E.g., Hughes v. Consol-Pa. Coal Co., 945 F.2d 594 (3d Cir. 1991) (involving a
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to use discovery procedures to inspect and copy the files, and the
lawyer will not be able to rely on either the attorney-client privilege
166
or the work product doctrine 167 to prevent this. The client should, and
usually does, enjoy equal access in deciding whether to bring the
action. 168
Policies concerning access to information have likewise governed
the result in cases involving accountants, even though these have
typically treated accountants as the owners of their work papers. The
more recent cases involved attempts by the government to obtain
access to clients' tax records. There, treating accountants as owners of
work papers was simply a step toward the conclusion that clients
should not be able to block access by pleading the Fifth
Amendment. 169  One can tell that this conclusion controlled the
property theory used to prop it by noting that the Fifth Amendment
objection was no more successful when raised by the accountant or by
a client to whom the accountant had returned the papers, 17' and that
the Supreme Court later reached the same conclusion without
mentioning the property theory.'7 ' Very likely the results in these
cases were influenced by the belief that accountants should keep a
greater distance from their clients than lawyers. 72 In any event, the
ultimate issue was who should have access to what information, just as
it is in cases involving lawyers' documents.
conflict of interest); Mayo v. State Bar, 587 P.2d 1158 (Cal. 1978) (involving lawyer's
debt to client); Olds v. Donnelly, 696 A.2d 633, 643 (N.J. 1997) (dictum) (discussing
malpractice claim); In re Tallon, 447 N.Y.S.2d 50 (App. Div. 1982) (sustaining
malpractice claim).
166. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343
(1985) (holding that trustee in bankruptcy may waive attorney-client privilege with
respect to pre-bankruptcy communications).
167. E.g., Spivey v. Zant, 683 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1982); Clark v. Milam, 847 F. Supp.
424 (S.D.W. Va. 1994); Ashcraft & Gerel, 728 A.2d at 798. In California, it is unclear
whether a client may obtain access to all lawyer work product. See Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer, Inc. v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 371 (Ct. App. 1994).
168. E.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. H-, P.C., 128 F.R.D. 647 (N.D. Tex. 1989);
Maleski v. Corporate Life Ins. Co., 641 A.2d 1 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994); Sage Realty
Corp., 689 N.E.2d at 879.
169. E.g., United States v. Zakutansky, 401 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1968); Deck v. United
States, 339 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1964). Even in older cases litigated between
accountant and client, a tax dispute with the government lurks in the background. See
Ablah v. Eyman, 365 P.2d 181 (Kan. 1961); Ipswich Mills v. Dillon, 157 N.E. 604
(Mass. 1927).
170. E.g., United States v. Widelski, 452 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Egenberg, 443 F.2d 512 (3d Cir. 1971).
171. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976); see In re Grand Jury Proceedings,
486 F. Supp. 1203 (D. Nev. 1980).
172. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2000) (addressing auditor's duty to disclose certain
illegal acts of audited corporation); United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S.
805, 817-19 (1984) (holding that there is no work product protection for accountant
papers in Internal Revenue Service proceeding).
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C. Unpaid-For Work Product
So far the discussion has assumed that the client seeking access to a
lawyer's files concerning its case has paid all relevant fees. When this
has not occurred, some authority supports allowing the lawyer to
withhold documents the lawyer prepared, not as a retaining lien to
induce payment, but because the client is not entitled to that for which
it has not paid. 73 Such documents are then referred to as work
product. This is confusing, because it recalls the "work product
doctrine" that protects a relatively broad range of material from
discovery,174 but that may not be invoked by a lawyer against his or
her own client.175 The problem of unpaid-for work product, however,
is distinct and important.
The argument against allowing clients access to work product for
which they have not paid is strongest in those unusual situations
where clients agree to pay, as it were, by the piece. Thus, the
Restatement provides a hypothetical illustration in which a client has
contracted to pay every month for preparation of a series of
memoranda, but stops paying after the second month.'76 It seems fair
enough that the lawyer may decline to deliver without payment the
memoranda prepared after that month, particularly if the client has no
urgent need for them or is well able to pay the contractual price. But
few real cases outside Restatementland will be that simple.
Determining which particular documents have not been paid for
can be difficult. Clients and lawyers sometimes place a price on
individual documents-say, $2,000 for the preparation of a will-but
this is rare. If the parties agree on a lump sum fee for a representation
that turns out to involve (among other tasks) the preparation of five
documents, and the client fails to pay one fifth of the sum due, does
that mean that the lawyer can designate one of the documents as not
having been paid for? If the contractual fee was an hourly one, and
the client claims that the lawyer overestimated the hours properly
devoted to the representation and therefore does not pay one fifth of
what the lawyer claims, should this too be considered a failure to pay
for one of the documents? Does it make a difference in allocating
payment to documents whether the lawyer's bills are sent every
month or at the end of the representation? Can the client designate
173. Mass. Rules Prof'l Conduct R. 1.16(e) (2001); D.C. Rules Prof'l Conduct R.
1.8(i) (2003); N.D. Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.19(e) (2003); Restatement (Third) of
the Law Governing Lawyers §§ 43(1), 46(2) (2000); Roscoe Pound, Am. Trial Law.
Found., supra note 5, at R. 5.5; see Nat'l Sales & Serv. Co. v. Superior Court, 667 P.2d
738 (Ariz. 1983) (allowing retaining lien on unpaid-for work product).
174. E.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (3), (4); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947);
Kevin M. Clermont, Surveying Work Product, 68 Cornell L. Rev. 755 (1983).
175. See supra note 167.
176. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 43 cmt. c, illus. 1
(2000).
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which part of the lawyer's services a payment covers? Contract law
has dealt with questions such as these, 77 but trying to make the
delivery of documents turn on them would lead to interminable
wrangling, opportunities for abuse, and results having little to do with
the principles that should govern the relationship between lawyers
and clients.
Those principles provide further reasons for questioning the claim
that a lawyer should be entitled to withhold documents for which a
client has not paid. Lawyers, after all, can be required to serve
without pay, for example by appointment of a court,178 or when a
court declines to allow a lawyer to withdraw even though a client has
ceased paying179 Delivering a document for which a client has not
paid is far less burdensome for a lawyer than accepting or continuing a
representation. It requires no new work, and the lawyer remains free
to sue the client for the unpaid fee.
Withholding a document, moreover, can be just as harmful to a
client when based on failure to pay for that particular document as
when based on a retaining lien. True, keeping documents for which a
client has not paid does not deprive the client of documents that the
lawyer did not write, and hence, does not penalize clients for
entrusting their documents or other property to lawyers. But if
documents are sufficiently important to the client, impounding them
for failure to pay is surely capable of subjecting the client to
disproportionate pressure, shifting the burden of litigation to the
client, and coercing settlement on the lawyer's terms. It is easy to say
that the client can avoid any problem by simply paying the bill; but the
bill may be reasonably disputed, or the client out of funds, and there
may be no time to find and retain another lawyer to recreate the
documents. Society would not allow a physician to retain a biopsy or
MRI for which a patient had not paid but had immediate need. 8 ° Is
there any real need for lawyers to have the right to do the equivalent?
At the very least, lawyers should not be free to keep documents on
the ground that they are work product for which the client has not
177. 3A Arthur Linton Corbin, Corbin on Contracts §§ 687-99 (rev. ed. 1993)
(noting the possibilities of confusion); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 240
(1981). For similar issues in billing by solicitors, see Abedi v. Pennington, 150 New
L.J. 465 (C.A. 2000).
178. Model Rules of Prof' Conduct R. 6.2 (2000); Wolfram, supra note 52, at 951-
52; Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., After Professional Virtue, 6 Sup. Ct. Rev. 213 (1989); see
Deborah L. Rhode, Cultures of Commitment: Pro Bono for Lawyers and Law
Students, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 2415 (1999); Symposium, Historical Perspectives on Pro
Bono Lawyering, 9 Am. U. J. Gender Soc. Pol'y & L. 59, 178 (2001).
179. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.16(c) (2000); see Pub. Defender Comm'n
v. Williamson, 971 S.W.2d 835 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that a public defender
must continue with a case despite loss of job); Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
536 A.2d 243 (N.J. 1988) (holding that a law firm with a conflict of interest must
remain in a case without pay).
180. See supra text accompanying notes 86-89.
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paid unless the assertedly unpaid fee is clearly allocable to the
documents in question. Nor should withholding be allowed if the
client cannot pay, or if withholding would significantly risk irreparable
harm to the client.' Because the lawyer keeping the documents may
not appraise correctly whether these conditions have been met, the
lawyer should be required to agree to arbitrate the underlying fee
dispute and the propriety of retaining documents if the client wishes
to do so. 182 Alternatively, if the matter in question is pending before a
court with jurisdiction to resolve these issues summarily, the lawyer
could submit them to that court. And of course the lawyer remains
free to sue for his fee.
CONCLUSION
Lawyers should be paid for their work. Usually they are. 83 When
they are not, they should be able to assert their claims to
compensation. Yet in an age when debt collection practices are
subject to increasing regulation," the liens of lawyers must be just as
subject to reconsideration as the attachment of bank accounts185 or the
garnishment of wages. 86
Reconsideration should spell the doom of the lawyer retaining lien.
Assertion of that lien is inconsistent with the fiduciary duties of a
lawyer to pursue a client's benefit, deserve a client's trust, conceal no
relevant information from a client, and refrain from taking unfair
advantage of a client's confidence or lack of knowledge. Even as a
method of collecting fees, the lien is far too coercive and destructive,
yet paradoxically haphazard and ineffective. Other methods for
ensuring that lawyers will receive what they are entitled to are more
reliable and less objectionable. The law and the legal profession
should no longer retain the retaining lien.
181. For this requirement, see D.C. Rules Prof'l Conduct R. 1.8(I) (2003); Mass.
Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.16(e)(7) (2001); Restatement (Third) of the Law
Governing Lawyers § 43(1) (2000).
182. See N. Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975) (holding that
state garnishment of a bank account denies due process when garnishee is not offered
speedy post-garnishment hearing); supra note 118 (proposing that lawyers asserting
retaining lien should be required to institute judicial proceeding within ten days).
183. U.S. Census Bureau, 2001 Service Annual Survey: Professional, Scientific and
Technical Services tbl. 6.1 (reporting law firm revenues for 2001 of $168,821,000,000),
at www.census.gov/svsd/www/sas54.html.
184. E.g., Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692a-o (1993); see
Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291 (1995) (applying Act to lawyers collecting debts for
clients).
185. N. Ga. Finishing, 419 U.S. at 601; Cal. Code Civ. P. §§ 481.010 to 493.010
(West Supp. 2004).
186. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1671-77
(2001).
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